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Oliveri: Setting the Stage for Ferguson

Setting the Stage for Ferguson: Housing
Discrimination and Segregation in St. Louis
Rigel C. Oliveri*
“What’s past is prologue.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
The St. Louis Metropolitan area, which includes St. Louis City and St.
Louis County (which itself contains ninety-one separate municipalities), is
one of the most racially segregated places in the United States.2 One common measure of segregation is called a dissimilarity index, which refers to the
evenness with which two groups are spread across component geographic
areas that make up a larger geographic entity.3 An index score of greater than
60 is considered high or extreme.4 In 2010, St. Louis’s black-white index
score was 70.6, the ninth highest in the country.5 Another way to assess segregation is through the isolation index, which measures the extent to which
members of a particular group are exposed only to each other.6 The blackwhite isolation score for St. Louis in 2010 was 62, the eleventh highest in the
country.7
This is not an accident. A century’s worth of discriminatory policies
and practices have gone into making St. Louis City and its surrounding com*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. B.A., University of Virginia; J.D., Stanford Law School. The author was formerly a Trial Attorney
for the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, in the Housing & Civil
Enforcement Section. I would like to thank the Missouri Law Review for inviting me
to be part of this important Symposium. Thanks are also in order to Cindy Bassett for
designing the excellent maps and graphics.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1.
2. Research & Statistics Div. of the St. Louis Cty. Dep’t of Planning, 2007–
2012 Fact Book, ST. LOUIS CTY., MO. i, http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/
Document%20Library/Maps%20and%20GIS/Fact%20Book/Fact%20Book%2020072012/introduction.pdf.
3. See Douglas S. Massey et al., The Changing Bases of Segregation in the
United States, 626 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 74, 76 (2009). The index
score can also be described as the percentage of one of the two groups that would
have to move from one geographic component to another geographic area in order to
produce a distribution that matches that of the larger area. Id.
4. Id. at 77.
5. John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis: New Findings from the 2010 Census, US2010 PROJECT 1, 6 (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf.
6. Massey et al., supra note 3.
7. Logan & Stults, supra note 5, at 8. Thus, the average black person in the
metro area lived in a neighborhood that was 62% black. See id.
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munities look the way they do today. Nor is this without consequence – hypersegregation and the discriminatory forces that cause it lead to a host of
other problems, including wealth disparity, school segregation and inequality,
and tensions between citizens and law enforcement. Perhaps most importantly, we become a nation of “two societies, one black, one white—separate and
unequal.”8 Those famous words were written in 1968 by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, which was formed to address the urban
riots of the late 1960s. Those riots occurred in highly segregated communities across the United States and, in many, the triggering event was an act of
police brutality against black residents. The Commission warned that more
violence would ensue if segregated living patterns, racialized policing, and
overall inequality persisted. And though much has changed in the ensuing
decades, the recent events in Ferguson, Missouri, demonstrate that too much
has remained the same.
It might be tempting to view what happened in Ferguson as a policing
problem, one of the many tragic instances of white police officers shooting
unarmed black men and boys. Certainly, this is an important piece of the
story and one which will be explored elsewhere in this Symposium. Some
have described the response – weeks of peaceful protests, but also rioting,
looting, arson, and property damage – as a symptom of community dysfunction, blaming poverty, poor schools, and lack of employment prospects.
There may be truth to this description as well, but it remains an oversimplification. To truly understand the events of the fall of 2014, I submit that we
have to look further back, to what might seem an unlikely source: housing
discrimination.
The history of St. Louis is replete with discriminatory housing laws, policies, and practices: racially restrictive covenants, redlining, blockbusting and
white flight, and exclusionary zoning. While these were common in virtually
every part of the United States, they were particularly egregious, widespread,
and pervasive in industrial Midwestern cities like Chicago, Detroit, and St.
Louis – which saw a large influx of blacks migrating from the south at the
close of the nineteenth century. In fact, three of the most foundational housing cases originated in St. Louis. When we look closely at these cases – not
just the legal principles that they established but the physical, racial geography of the homes, neighborhoods, and cities that were contested – we can see
how they reflected the racist forces that shaped the reality of modern metropolitan St. Louis. This can give us insight into what happened in Ferguson
and why.

8. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFERENCE SERV., REPORT 1 (1968), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/
8073NCJRS.pdf.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/10

2

Oliveri: Setting the Stage for Ferguson

2015]

SETTING THE STAGE FOR FERGUSON

1055

II. A STORY OF SEGREGATION, IN THREE CASES
A. Act 1: Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)
The story begins a century ago, in 1915, when a group of St. Louis realtors created an organization, the United Welfare Association, in order to advocate for a racially exclusionary zoning ordinance.9 The ordinance would
bar blacks from living on blocks that were more than 75% white (and vice
versa).10 They succeeded in getting the measure placed on the ballot the following year.11 The measure passed easily, and St. Louis became one of a
handful of areas around the nation with such a law.12 An identical law was
struck down by the Supreme Court the following year as a violation of due
process and property rights, in Buchanan v. Warley.13
In the absence of explicit laws, the widespread practice of raciallyrestrictive covenants began, in which developers and neighborhood associations placed deed restrictions on properties, preventing them from being occupied by blacks.14 This practice was promoted by realtors nationwide, but in
St. Louis, the local real estate industry – which had pressed for the racial zoning measure – was particularly enthusiastic and organized in its support of
covenants.15 An association called the St. Louis Real Estate Exchange created a “Committee on the Protection of Property” whose purpose was to promote the use of covenants and to help with their enforcement.16 This Committee provided a “Uniform Restriction Agreement” with model covenant
language that was used in approximately 85% of the restrictive agreements in
force.17 Members went door-to-door to help organize neighborhood associations for the purposes of enacting restrictive covenants.18 The Exchange was
also a formal party to most of the covenants, and it provided legal assistance

9. COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE
AMERICAN CITY 70 (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2008).
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 71.
13. 245 U.S. 60, 80–81 (1917). Interestingly, the Buchanan case involved a
white homeowner who wished to sell his house to a black buyer, in violation of the
zoning law. Id. at 72–73. Thus, the Court approached the issue as a matter of the
white man’s rights to dispose of his property, which were infringed by the law, and
not as a matter of the black man’s rights to purchase that property. Id. at 73.
14. GORDON, supra note 9, at 73.
15. Id. at 79.
16. Id.
17. Id.; Richard Rothstein, The Making of Ferguson: Public Policies at the Root
of Its Troubles, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1, 13 (Oct. 15, 2014), http://s3.epi.org/files/
2014/making-of-ferguson-final.pdf.
18. GORDON, supra note 9, at 79.
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to the neighborhood associations when it came time to enforce the covenants
in court.19
Restrictive covenants also became part of federal mortgage policy, as
carried out by the Home Owners Loan Corporation (“HOLC”) and the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”).20 From their creation in the mid-1930s
through the Second World War, these agencies backed the financing of between one-quarter to one-half of all new home sales.21 The FHA underwriting manual stated that “protection against some adverse influences,” such as
“the ingress of undesirable racial or nationality groups,” must be obtained by
“proper zoning and deed restrictions.”22 “Restrictive covenants should
strengthen and supplement zoning ordinances,” the manual suggested, and are
“apt to prove more effective than a zoning ordinance in providing protection
from adverse influences.”23 The FHA specifically recommended restrictions
against “occupancy of properties[,] except by the race for which they were
intended.”24
Meanwhile, the HOLC drafted a series of “residential security maps”
which were intended to guide mortgage lending activity.25 While these maps
took into account factors such as the age of housing stock, they were primarily guided by the racial composition of the neighborhoods.26 In St. Louis, the
existence of restrictive covenants helped an area gain a highly favorable A or
B rating.27 Majority black neighborhoods were given the lowest rating – D,
for Hazardous – and colored red.28 Racially transitional neighborhoods were
given a C, for “definitely declining,” and colored yellow.29
All of these actions reflected the racist belief that the presence of blacks
in a neighborhood would lower property values and bring with it crime and
other nuisances. The result was that virtually all of St. Louis’s black population was confined to just a few neighborhoods in the center of the City.30 As
these neighborhoods grew increasingly crowded, there was nowhere that

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 88.
Rothstein, supra note 17, at 15; GORDON, supra note 9, at 91.
GORDON, supra note 9, at 91.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID 52 (1993) (citing a confidential HOLC survey of St. Louis real estate that
warned about the “rapidly increasing Negro population” and the problem this would
cause for the maintenance of property values).
30. See GORDON, supra note 9, at 94.
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black families could move.31 The unavailability of mortgage capital in these
neighborhoods further contributed to the plummeting of property values.
With overcrowding and falling property values came the deterioration of
housing stock, rising crime, and substandard city services.32 The racist belief
thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
By 1945, roughly 300 neighborhood covenants were in force throughout
the City.33 That same year, J.D. and Ethel Shelley, a black couple, purchased
a small rowhouse at 4600 Labadie Avenue in the Fairground District of St.
Louis.34 The houses in the neighborhood were subject to a covenant, which
had been agreed upon by thirty out of the original thirty-nine property owners.35 The covenant prohibited any house from being occupied “by any person not of the Caucasian race” and specifically stated that it was intended to
prevent “the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property
for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.”36
Louis and Fern Kraemer, a white couple who lived in the neighborhood, sued
to enforce the covenant.37
The Supreme Court of Missouri sided with the Kraemers, determining
that the covenant was a valid agreement and that its enforcement by the court
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, which only applied to “a state
action exclusively.”38 Indeed, to hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would
be “to deny the parties to such an agreement one of the fundamental privileges of citizenship, access to the courts.”39

31. Id. at 78 (citing a 1947 report of the St. Louis Urban League, which found
that approximately 97% of the black population of St. Louis lived in the city center
and that they faced a critical lack of housing).
32. See id. at 223 (“As a rapidly growing African American population crowded
into hastily but strictly circumscribed blocks or neighborhoods, the immediate consequence was not only extreme stress on the housing stock but also an easy equation of
overcrowding, crime, poor sanitation, and poor health with black occupancy itself.”).
33. Id. at 75.
34. Id. at 82.
35. Id.
36. Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Mo. 1946) (en banc), reversed,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
37. GORDON, supra note 9, at 82. Significantly, tax-exempt religious organizations joined in this fight – on the side of the Kraemers. Rothstein, supra note 17, at
15. Richard Rothstein reports that the Cote Brilliante Presbyterian Church and the
Waggoner Place Methodist Episcopal Church South (also a covenant signatory) provided funds to support the Kraemers’ lawsuit. Id.
38. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d at 683.
39. Id. Interestingly, the court did express some sympathy for the plight of the
black residents of St. Louis who were unable to move out of their overcrowded
neighborhoods because of restrictive covenants:
The [lower court] found the negro population in St.Louis [sic] has greatly increased in recent years, and now numbers in excess of 100,000; and that some
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The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision, ruling that the coercive power of the courts to enforce the covenant was
clearly state action, and thus subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.40 Shelley
v. Kraemer, which made restrictive covenants unenforceable throughout the
United States, was thus one of the earliest and most important decisions in
favor of the cause of fair housing.41

B. Act 2: Jones v. Mayer (1968)
While Shelley v. Kraemer was an unquestionable civil rights victory,
nothing about the case stopped people and institutions from engaging in private acts of housing discrimination. Racially restrictive covenants were no
longer enforceable by law, but people were still free to enter into such voluntary agreements, a point made clear by the Supreme Court opinion.42 Sellers
could – and did – simply refuse to sell their homes to minority buyers.43
St. Louis real estate agents continued to refuse to sell homes in white
neighborhoods to blacks.44 They drew up their own “restricted” (black) and
“unrestricted” (white) zones on the map.45 They aggressively steered black
homeseekers away from unrestricted neighborhoods and often outright lied to
them about the availability of houses in unrestricted areas.46 In the 1920s,
both the Real Estate Exchange and the Missouri Real Estate Commission had
adopted a code of ethics that prohibited “introducing into a neighborhood . . .
members of any race or nationality . . . whose presence will clearly be detriof the sections in which negroes live are overcrowded, which is detrimental to
their moral and physical well being.
Such living conditions bring deep concern to everyone, and present a grave
and acute problem to the entire community. Their correction should strikingly
challenge both governmental and private leadership. It is tragic that such conditions seem to have worsened although much has been written and said on
the subject from coast to coast. But their correction is beyond the authority of
the courts generally, and in particular in a case involving the determination of
contractual rights between parties to a law suit [sic]. If their correction is
sought in the field of government, the appeal must be addressed to its branches other than the judicial.

Id. (citations omitted).
40. Shelley, 334 U.S. 1, 20.
41. Id.
42. “[T]he restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed to [the Shelleys] by the Fourteenth Amendment. So
long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to
their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the State and the
provisions of the Amendment have not been violated.” Id. at 13.
43. GORDON, supra note 9, at 82.
44. Id. at 84.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 84–87.
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mental to property values in that neighborhood.”47 Thus, selling a home in a
white neighborhood to a black buyer would constitute professional misconduct and cause a realtor to lose his or her license.48 In the wake of Shelley,
St. Louis realtors doubled down on their adherence to this standard.49 The
Exchange immediately approved a recommendation that no realtor sell to
blacks or assist in the financing of any sale to black buyers for property “outside of the established unrestricted districts.”50 In 1955, the Exchange sent a
notice to its members warning that “no Member of our Board may . . . sell to
Negroes . . . unless there are three separate and distinct buildings in such
block already occupied by Negroes.”51
Again, these practices were motivated by the belief that the presence of
blacks in a neighborhood would ruin property values and that once black
families gained entry into a place, it would quickly lead to neighborhood
turnover. Nevertheless, with the unenforceability of covenants and a growing
number of private sales, black residents slowly began to make inroads into
new neighborhoods within the City. Some realtors then engaged in the practice of blockbusting – stirring up racial anxiety in a neighborhood at the notion of black encroachment and inducing the white residents to sell.52 Realtors sometimes purchased the properties themselves at a “panic sale” discount
and then re-sold them at a much higher price to black families moving in.53
Again, the realtors and white residents caused their fears about neighborhood
instability to become self-fulfilling prophecies.
At the same time, urban renewal and redevelopment projects demolished some existing black neighborhoods in the City and led to the dislocation of thousands of black residents.54 Those residents who were fortunate
enough to get relocation assistance were often placed in large-scale public
housing projects, such as the infamous Pruitt-Igoe complex.55 The vast majority of these projects were concentrated within black neighborhoods in the
City – virtually none were built outside of the City limits.56 The effect was to
entrench both poverty and segregation in these neighborhoods, while allowing the St. Louis County suburbs to develop as middle-class white enclaves.
Although Shelley caused the FHA to officially eliminate its insistence
on racially-restrictive covenants and to refuse to insure properties covered by
new covenants, this policy did not apply to those covenants already in
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 85–86; Rothstein, supra note 17, at 26.
Rothstein, supra note 17, at 25.
Id.
GORDON, supra note 9, at 99–100. Professor Gordon points to the enormous
Mill Creek renewal project, which displaced over 16,000 people, nearly all of whom
were black. Id. at 99.
55. Id. at 100.
56. Id.
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place.57 Moreover, the local FHA office continued to rely on the raciallydriven neighborhood ratings developed by HOLC, which continued to give C
ratings to the City neighborhoods that blacks were moving into and D ratings
to all of St. Louis’s predominantly black neighborhoods.58 Well into the
1950s and 1960s, FHA manuals continued to prioritize neighborhood homogeneity, and the St. Louis FHA office warned against changes in the “social
characteristics” of neighborhood occupants.59 As a practical matter, this
meant that the vast majority of FHA-backed mortgages went to the rapidly
developing all-white neighborhoods in St. Louis County. Between 1934 and
1960, 84% of FHA mortgages in the area went to properties outside the
City.60 And because black buyers were prevented by discrimination from
accessing these markets, virtually none of them were able to obtain an FHAbacked mortgage. Out of 400,000 FHA mortgages made in the St. Louis
metro area between 1962 and 1967, only 3.3% went to black borrowers.61
For black borrowers in St. Louis County, that figure dropped to below 1%.62
Bolstered by FHA mortgages, whites began to flee the City in record
numbers, and developers were there to meet this growing demand. One of
the most successful was Alfred H. Mayer, whose eponymous company acquired a large parcel of land next to the Paddock Country Club and golf
course in North St. Louis County.63 Mayer subdivided the property and
named the subdivision Paddock Woods.64 In 1965, Joseph Lee and Barbara
Jo Jones, a married couple, were seeking to move out of their overcrowded
neighborhood in the City and into the suburbs.65 They viewed a display
house at Paddock Woods and liked it enough to put in an offer for a lot on
Hyde Park Drive.66 They were informed by a Mayer sales agent that Mayer
would not consider their purchase offer because Joseph Jones was black, and
it was Mayer’s “general policy not to sell houses and lots to Negroes.”67
The Joneses filed suit, alleging violations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as well as violations of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which was later re-codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82.68
Section 1981 holds in part that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . .
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 91.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 91–92.
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 29, at 54; GORDON, supra note 9, at 96.
GORDON, supra note 9, at 96.
Id. This figure represented just 56 borrowers. Id.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115, 118 (E.D. Mo. 1966), reversed, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
64. Brief for Petitioner, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, (No. 645),
1968 WL 129310 at *5.
65. Id. at *7.
66. Jones, 255 F. Supp. at 118.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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as is enjoyed by white citizens.”69 Section 1982 states simply that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.”70
The sticking point for the Joneses’ claim was the issue left untouched by
Shelley v. Kraemer: the fact that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
and the Civil Rights Act, which was meant to enforce them, had historically
been viewed as applying only to government actions. Indeed, the District
Court dismissed the Joneses’ complaint on this basis, which was upheld by
the Eighth Circuit.71
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and found that § 1982 was in
fact intended to reach private acts of race discrimination.72 From a legal
standpoint, this decision was extraordinary. Never before had the Supreme
Court interpreted the Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes as reaching purely private conduct – the dissent pointed out how implausible it is that the
Congress which passed these statutes in 1866 would have ever intended them
to reach so far.73
The Jones decision would have been truly monumental if other events
had not overshadowed it. Two days after the oral argument before the Supreme Court, Dr. Martin Luther King was assassinated, and riots engulfed
several American cities.74 One week later, President Johnson signed the Fair
Housing Act – the nation’s first comprehensive remedial civil rights law directed to housing – into law.75 The Fair Housing Act prohibited all manner of
discrimination in housing, and thus provided all the protections that the holding in Jones v. Mayer did and then some, a fact that the Court acknowledged
when it handed down its opinion two months later.76
Although the Joneses ultimately won their case, they were never able to
buy a house in the Paddock Woods development.77 While their lawsuit
wound its way through the courts, the couple instead settled on a more modestly-priced ranch house a few miles away in Florissant.78 A week after the
Supreme Court’s decision came down, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
Id. § 1982.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968).
Id. at 480.
Id. at 436.
Jones v. Alfred
H.
Mayer
Company,
OYEZ
PROJECT,
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/645 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015); Martin Luther
King, Jr., ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/biography/MartinLuther-King-Jr (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
75. Fair Housing Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
topic/Fair-Housing-Act (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
76. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413–14.
77. Darrell A.H. Miller, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the
History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999, 1038 (2008).
78. Id. at 1038–39.
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that all of the Paddock Woods homes had been sold and that the market price
of the homes had “risen considerably from the $28,500 that the Jones were
prepared to pay in 1965.”79

C. Act 3: United States v. City of Black Jack (1974)
As important a turning point as the year 1968 was for the fair housing
movement, it also marked the beginning of the true exodus of whites from St.
Louis City. The City’s population fell by almost 170,000 between 1970 and
1980, as whites abandoned the City for the outlying areas.80 The most egregious of discriminatory practices by private sellers, banks, and real estate
brokers had been made illegal. Although discriminatory attitudes were still
prevalent, and private acts of discrimination continued to occur, it was no
longer safe to engage in overt discrimination, or to discriminate as an official
policy.
Exclusionary zoning was one method of preventing black families from
moving into the virtually all-white municipalities in St. Louis County.81 In
contrast to the explicitly racial zoning of fifty years earlier, these racially
neutral zoning ordinances did things like require single family homes on large
lots that would be out of the price range for many black families – who were
either renters or the owners of houses in the City with comparatively little
value – and bar the construction of public housing, low-income housing, and
even multi-family housing (i.e., apartment buildings) that would be likely to
attract black occupants.82
The desire for exclusionary zoning also contributed to the proliferation
of tiny municipalities around the City of St. Louis. Until recently, there were
few rules for municipal incorporation in Missouri. Developers continued
creating subdivisions in unincorporated areas outside of the City, primarily
catering to the fleeing whites.83 These subdivisions would then incorporate.84
There were a number of benefits to incorporation, one of which was that they
could enact exclusionary zoning ordinances with the purpose of excluding
lower income people and blacks from the City.85 This led to a patchwork
quilt of ninety-one separate municipal entities in St. Louis counties, some less
than one square mile in area and many with fewer than 2000 residents.86

79. Id. (quoting Couple’s House Hunt Is Still On, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
June 23, 1968, at 13A).
80. GORDON, supra note 9, at 25.
81. Id. at 131.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 152.
85. Id. at 147.
86. Municipalities, ST. LOUIS CTY., MO., http://www.stlouisco.com/
YourGovernment/Municipalities (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
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Black Jack was one such newly-formed community.87 In 1970, it was
part of a large, unincorporated area governed by St. Louis County.88 The
population was 99% white.89 In the area that would later become the City of
Black Jack, virtually all of the land was either occupied by single family
homes or undeveloped.90 In 1969, a nonprofit organization called the Inter
Religious Center for Urban Affairs (“ICUA”) began planning a development
called Park View Heights in the area, which was “to create alternative housing opportunities for persons of low and moderate income living in the ghetto
areas of St. Louis.”91 The ICUA located a suitable parcel of land and put in
an option for it.92 The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) issued a feasibility letter in 1970, essentially greenlighting the project for federal funding.93 Opposition by the area residents was both fierce
and swift.94 They immediately began a drive to incorporate the area, which
included the proposed project.95 Two months after the feasibility letter, the
City of Black Jack was incorporated.96 Two months after that, the City’s first
official act was to pass a zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of any
new multifamily dwellings.97
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) challenged the zoning ordinance in
federal court, alleging that it was motivated by racial animus and was discriminatory in effect.98 The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
ruled in favor of the City, finding that even if some of the officials involved
had racist motivations, “[R]acial considerations must be shown as part of the
legislation.”99 The district court also disputed the DOJ’s statistical showing
of disparate impact and concluded that even if the ordinance did keep black
families from moving into the City, this fact was not a sufficient enough concern to override local zoning authority.100
The Eighth Circuit reversed, handing down the first appellate court decision to recognize the validity of the so-called disparate impact theory under

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

GORDON, supra note 9, at 147.
Id.
Id. at 149.
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1974).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1181. A related challenge was brought by the ICUA and the Park
View Heights Corporation. Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 335 F.
Supp. 899 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
99. United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319, 329 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
100. Id. at 330.
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the Fair Housing Act.101 This theory holds that even a facially neutral action
can violate antidiscrimination law if it disproportionately affects a particular
group without serving a legitimate business reason or compelling government
interest.102 The Eighth Circuit found that a disparate impact was indeed present: “The ultimate effect of the ordinance was to foreclose 85 percent of the
blacks living in the metropolitan area from obtaining housing in Black Jack,
and to foreclose them at a time when 40 percent of them were living in substandard or overcrowded units.”103 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.104
Today, this case is one of the most-commonly cited in support of the disparate impact principle in fair housing cases.105
Although the Eighth Circuit’s opinion was based on the existence of a
disparate impact, the court went out of its way to make clear that this did not
mean that the ordinance’s supporters were free of racial animus.106 To the
contrary, it found:
There is evidence in the record to support [the] contention [that the
purpose of the ordinance was to exclude blacks]. Opposition to Park
View Heights was repeatedly expressed in racial terms by persons
whom the District Court found to be the leaders of the incorporation
movement, by individuals circulating petitions, and by zoning commissioners themselves. Racial criticism of Park View Heights was
made and cheered at public meetings. The uncontradicted evidence
indicates that, at all levels of opposition, race played a significant role,
both in the drive to incorporate and the decision to rezone.107

Despite a victory in the courts, the supporters of mixed income multifamily housing in Black Jack failed to achieve their objective.108 By the time
the Eight Circuit’s opinion came down, the proposed site had been bought
back by the City.109 HUD’s support for the project had waned, financing was

101. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1188. The disparate impact standard had first been
recognized by the Supreme Court in the context of employment discrimination and
Title VII in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
102. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430–32. Even if such an interest is shown, a plaintiff can
still prevail by showing that the interest can be met through alternate means that do
not create the disparate impact. Id.
103. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186.
104. City of Black Jack v. United States, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
105. This year, for the first time, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the viability
of disparate impact theory in fair housing cases. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs
v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). The theory was upheld by a
narrow majority. Id. at 2526.
106. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186.
107. Id. at 1188 n.3.
108. GORDON, supra note 9, at 150.
109. Id.
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difficult because of rising interest rates, and the hostility toward such projects
had only intensified.110

III. TODAY
This depressing history boils down to one basic truth: The black population of St. Louis City and County has a long history of being denied access to
one of the most significant sources of wealth accumulation for most Americans – a home, in a stable and functioning neighborhood, purchased on reasonable terms. All of the discriminatory forces that skewed the housing markets decade after decade – and by extension the tax bases, school systems,
and development patterns – are evident in the map of the metro area today.
Black people in St. Louis are no longer held back by legalized discrimination,
but as one commentator notes, “Policies that are no longer in effect and seemingly have been reformed still cast a long shadow.”111
Today, the house that the Shelleys purchased in 1948 sits on a run-down
block in a neighborhood that is now 100% black.112 Much of the City’s black
population has moved northward into the inner-ring municipalities.113 The
Paddock Woods subdivision now has a majority black population114 – ironically, testing in the late 1990s revealed that real estate agents in the area were
actually steering black prospective buyers to the neighborhood.115 The City
of Black Jack is now 81.5% black.116 Whites, meanwhile, have continued to
110. Id. Professor Gordon quotes one of the Park View Heights lawyers as saying, “No developer in his or her right mind . . . at this point in time would go into the
City of Black Jack and attempt to build low and moderate income housing . . . .” Id.
111. Rothstein, supra note 17, at 4.
112. Google Street View reveals a number of vacant lots and boarded up buildings
on the blocks near where the house is located. Google Street View of 4600 Labadie
Ave., St. Louis, Mo., GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps (search for
“4600 Labadie Ave., St. Louis, Mo.” and click “Street View”). A census-mapping
website indicates that the neighborhood is over 99% black. See Justice Map, ENERGY
JUST.
NETWORK,
http://www.energyjustice.net/justice/index.php?gsLayer=black&gfLon=95.3&gfLat=39.6&giZoom=4 (search for “4600 Labadie Ave., St. Louis, Mo.” in the
“Address” box then click “Go”). The Trulia website estimates that the average list
price for a home in the neighborhood is $36,416. Property Details for 4600 Labadie
Ave, TRULIA, http://www.trulia.com/homes/Missouri/Saint_Louis/sold/999987-4600Labadie-Ave-Saint-Louis-MO-63115 (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
113. Rothstein, supra note 17, at 68.
114. One website estimates the black population in Paddock Woods as 58%.
Paddock Woods, FINDTHEHOME, http://places.findthehome.com/l/278271/PaddockWoods-Florissant-MO (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
115. The case in which the testing data were presented was Metropolitan St. Louis
Equal Housing Opportunity Council v. Grundaker. 132 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (E.D. Mo.
2001).
116. Black Jack Demographics, MO. DEMOGRAPHICS, http://www.missouridemographics.com/black-jack-demographics (last visited Sept. 6, 2015).
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move westward and to the south, into middle-class and highly affluent neighborhoods. In fact, three of the wealthiest communities in the United States
can be found in this part of St. Louis County: Frontenac, Ladue, and Town &
Country,117 each of which has a black population of less than 2.6%.118 Finally, the existence of so many tiny municipal governments, particularly in cashstrapped North County, has led to a number of fiscal and management problems within the region.119 Many of these municipalities had difficulty supporting their own overhead costs – separate police and fire departments,
courts, etc. – particularly as their tax bases eroded.120
Now let us consider how Ferguson fits into this story and how these
events came to shape the Ferguson of today. Incorporated in 1894, Ferguson
began as one of the white enclaves outside of the St. Louis city limits.121 For
decades, its black population was virtually zero, although it bordered the
small, majority black city of Kinloch.122 Until the late 1960s, Ferguson
blocked off the main road that connected it to Kinloch with a chain, causing
some commentators to speculate that Ferguson was a “Sundown Town” that
actually banned black people after dark.123 For many years since the 1930s,
Ferguson had a single family zoning ordinance that banned virtually all
apartment buildings – a small swath was permitted in the 1930s to create a
buffer between the business district and the existing single family homes.124
After 1968, with Jones v. Mayer and the passage of the Fair Housing
Act, black families slowly began to move into Ferguson and other formerly
all-white municipalities in North St. Louis County.125 As they did so, the

117. Andy Kiersz et al., The 25 Wealthiest Suburbs in America, BUS. INSIDER
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/richest-suburbs-in-america-2014-10.
118. Fronteac, Missouri, CITY-DATA, http://www.city-data.com/city/FrontenacMissouri.html#b (last visited Oct. 3, 2015); John Hoffmann, Tale of Four Cities and
Traffic Stops, CHESTERFIELD PATCH (June 7, 2012), http://patch.com/
missouri/chesterfield/the-tale-of-four-cities-and-traffic-stops.
119. See Stephen Deere, North County Municipalities Talking about Merger of
Courts before Reforms are Forced on Them, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 8,
2015),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/north-countymunicipalities-talking-about-merger-of-courts-before-reforms/article_c0ba92ab-3d395cb0-a8a3-d55eda0269e2.html.
120. GORDON, supra note 9, at 59. Professor Gordon discusses the many problems this fragmented system of local government presents. Id. at 39–68.
121. Ferguson, Missouri, ABOUT ST. LOUIS, http://aboutstlouis.com/local/
communities/ferguson-missouri (last visited Sept. 7, 2015); Ronald S. Martin, Ferguson Shows a nation at War with Itself, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 16, 2014),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/16/ferguson-shows-a-nation-at-warwith-itself.html.
122. GORDON, supra note 9, at 146.
123. Id.; Rothstein, supra note 17, at 2–3; see JOHN A. WRIGHT, SR., KINLOCH:
MISSOURI’S FIRST BLACK CITY 127 (2000).
124. GORDON, supra note 9, at 137–38.
125. Id. at 147–49.
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whites fled further west and south. In 1970, Ferguson was still 99% white.126
In 1980, as the pace of black mobility increased, the town was 85% white and
14% black.127 During the 1980s, the Lambert International Airport sought to
expand.128 The project involved taking much of the land in Kinloch from its
relatively poor black residents.129 From 1990 to 2000, Kinloch lost over 80%
of its population, and many of the residents displaced by the airport expansion ended up in Ferguson – specifically in Canfield Green, the apartment
complex where Michael Brown was killed.130 By 2010, Ferguson was 29%
white and 67% black.131 Figure 1 illustrates this rapid demographic shift.
FIGURE 1

126. Paulina Firozi, 5 Things to Know about Ferguson, USA TODAY (Aug. 19,
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/08/14/ferguson-policedepartment-details/14064451/.
127. The Death of Michael Brown Racial History Behind the Ferguson Protests,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/opinion/racialhistory-behind-the-ferguson-protests.html.
128. Jeffrey Smith, You Can’t Understand Ferguson Without First Understanding
These Three Things, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/119106/ferguson-missouris-complicated-history-poverty-and-racial-tension.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Ferguson
(city),
Missouri,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2923986.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
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This left an inherently unstable population mix. In Ferguson, as in
many of the other previously off-limits areas, the newer black entrants tended
to be poorer132 and more transient.133 Many were renters or first-time homebuyers.134 A disproportionate number of these new homebuyers took out
subprime or predatory mortgages.135 More than half of the mortgages made
in the area from 2004 to 2007 were subprime, and these mortgages were disproportionately taken out by black borrowers.136 As a result, Ferguson and
other inner-ring North County areas were hit hard by the subprime mortgage
crises. By 2014, roughly one of every eleven houses in the area had gone into
foreclosure.137 Of the remaining owner-occupied homes, 50% were underwater, as compared with a national average of 17%.138
The school population also shifted rapidly, leading to a dramatic resegregation of the public schools.139 As white families fled, so too did the more
experienced teachers and administrators.140 Black families with the means to

132. According to the 2009–2013 American Community Survey, about 25% of
Ferguson’s population lives below the federal poverty level. See Poverty Status in the
Past 12 Months 2009–2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/
13_5YR/S1701/1600000US2923986 (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
133. Danielle Cadet, Braden Goyette & Nick Wing, 21 Numbers That Will Help
You Understand Why Ferguson Is About More Than Michael Brown, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/22/ferguson-blackamerica_n_5694364.html.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Jim Gallagher, Blame Poverty, Age, For Weak North County Home Market,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/metro/blame-poverty-age-for-weak-north-county-homemarket/article_95c998e5-bb87-5bc0-9054-83e801b357ac.html.
137. Id. This mirrors nationwide patterns of subprime lending and foreclosures in
segregated areas. Id. Jacob S. Rugh and Douglas S. Massey found that the greater
degree of black segregation a metropolitan area exhibits, the higher the number and
rate of foreclosures it experienced. Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 644 (2010).
The authors note that “the housing boom and the immense profits that it generated
frequently came at the expense of poor minorities living in central cities and inner
suburbs who were targeted by specialized mortgage brokers and affiliates of national
banks and subjected to discriminatory lending practices.” Id. at 634.
138. Matthew Goldstein, Another Shadow in Ferguson as Outside Firms Buy and
Rent Out Distressed Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2014/09/03/another-shadow-in-ferguson-as-outside-firms-buy-and-rentout-distressed-homes/.
139. Nikole Hannah-Jones, School Segregation, the Continuing Tragedy of Ferguson, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/fergusonschool-segregation.
140. Id. (“[S]chools buckled under their swift demographic shift, beginning a
steep decline. Many of the best teachers followed the white and middle-class exodus.
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send their children to private or charter schools did so, and the population that
remained in the public schools in the area was disproportionately black and
poor.141 The percentages of black students in the four school districts that
serve Ferguson are 98.8%, 97.8%, 79.9%, and 72.9%.142 With such rapid
demographic and economic shifts, some of the schools went into free-fall.
One of the school districts in Ferguson, Riverview Gardens, was performing
so poorly that it had lost its accreditation at the time of Michael Brown’s
death.143 The Normandy School District, where Michael Brown attended
high school, borders Ferguson.144 It is among the poorest schools in Missouri, and 97.5% of its students are black.145 It ranks last in overall academic
performance and had also lost its accreditation at the time of Michael
Brown’s death – which was just a few days after he graduated.146
These rapid demographic changes also led to strained relationships between Ferguson’s growing black population base and its existing white power
structure. At the time of Michael Brown’s death, Ferguson had a majority
black population but a municipal government that was almost entirely white:
The mayor was white, the School Board had six whites and one Latino, and
the City Council had just one black member.147 The police force was just 6%
black.148
At the same time, Ferguson, like many of its small neighbors, disproportionately relied on revenue from traffic tickets, fines, and citations in order to
help finance municipal operations.149 City officials worked in concert with
the police department to maximize revenue generation through an aggressive
system of stopping residents and citing them for as many infractions as possiInstruction fell off. The district suffered from a revolving door of leadership, with
principals and superintendents seldom sticking around more than a couple of years.”).
141. Id.
142. See Mo. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., District Report Card, MO.
COMPREHENSIVE DATA SYS., http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/School%
20Report%20Card/District%20Report%20Card.aspx?rp:SchoolYear=2014&rp:Schoo
lYear=2013&rp:SchoolYear=2012&rp:SchoolYear=2011&rp:DistrictCode=096109.
Another product of the proliferation of tiny governments in the St. Louis Metro area
is the fact that school districts bear little relationship to the municipal borders; thus,
Ferguson is served by four different school districts, which it shares with other municipalities. Schools, CITY OF FERGUSON, http://www.fergusoncity.com/165/Schools
(last visited Sept. 7, 2015).
143. Charles Jaco, What’s Next for Under Performing Missouri Schools?,
http://fox2now.com/2014/01/25/whats-next-for-underFOX2NOW ST. LOUIS,
performing-missouri-schools/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
144. Hannah-Jones, supra note 139.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Jeff Smith, In Ferguson, Black Town, White Power, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/opinion/in-ferguson-black-town-whitepower.html?_r=0.
148. Id. Four officers out of fifty-six were black. Id.
149. Id.
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ble.150 In the period between 2010 and 2014, Ferguson police issued over
90,000 citations and summonses for municipal violations – without any corresponding increase in the actual amount of serious crime.151 The burden of
this fell on Ferguson’s black population, whose members were disproportionately stopped, cited, and arrested by a police force that was overwhelmingly
white.152 Although blacks made up roughly 67% of Ferguson’s population in
2013, 85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations, and 93% of arrests in Ferguson
were of black people.153 The municipal court – whose employees were virtually all white154 – operated as part of the police department, overseen by the
Chief of Police, and was physically located inside of the police department
building.155 It existed primarily as a mechanism to collect fines from black
residents, often from multiple minor offenses that would snowball with fees
and penalties if the resident was unable to pay.156 Ultimately, a resident
might face thousands of dollars in fines, a suspended driver’s license, and an
arrest warrant, all for minor citations.
The result was an explosive situation, which set the stage both for the
death of Michael Brown and the anger and frustration that erupted afterwards.
Of course there were many factors that contributed to what happened in Ferguson, but when we consider the history set forth above in the context of the
real places involved, as in Figure 2, we can see that Ferguson was literally in
the center of some of the most contentious and significant struggles for fair
housing in the last century.

150. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE
DEPARTMENT
10,
11
(Mar.
4,
2015),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/
2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Id. at 5, 7.
153. Id. at 4.
154. The Municipal Judge, Prosecuting Attorney, Court Clerk, and all assistant
court clerks were white. Id. at 8.
155. Id. at 8.
156. Id. at 3–4.
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FIGURE 2

IV. CONCLUSION
What lessons can we take from this story? To begin, with respect to
housing in the St. Louis metropolitan area, the playing field was never level,
the market was never free, and housing opportunity was never truly equal. It
is simply impossible for a region – and a people – to experience so many
years of sustained, systemic interference with such a foundational resource as
housing without profound repercussions. To the extent that Ferguson – and
the entire metropolitan area – suffers from segregation, a skewed housing
market, and dysfunctional local government, such outcomes are the direct
byproducts of a century’s worth of discriminatory policies and practices in
the region. These actions, based on a racist fear of the conflict, depressed
property values and social problems that would supposedly come if black
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people’s housing choices were not restricted, managed to create exactly those
effects.157 The past, indeed, is prologue.
From this, we can draw a conclusion: These problems, so long and deliberate in the making, will not magically fix themselves. Court victories
against private and public discrimination are not enough. Neighborhoods will
not simply integrate (and a snapshot that looks like integration is more likely
to be an area that, like Ferguson, is transitioning). Black residents of St. Louis City and County cannot easily make up the lost opportunity to accumulate
wealth over generations that homeownership in a stable, prosperous neighborhood would have provided.
Coming up with solutions is more difficult. In the wake of what happened in Ferguson, a number of measures have already been taken to reform
the police department and the municipal reliance on fines for revenue generation.158 Commentators have proposed consolidation of small local governments, which would help cash-strapped North County communities obtain
economies of scale.159 There are nearly constant calls for changes to the
school districting and funding mechanisms.160
But what can be done now with respect to housing, which created so
many of the area’s underlying problems to begin with? Here, the solutions
are less obvious and more incremental. Predatory and subprime mortgage
lending must be aggressively policed, and fair lending enforcement must continue to ensure that black borrowers are not discriminated against. Assistance
must continue to be provided to those borrowers whose homes are still underwater, in the form of refinancing programs such as the federal government’s Home Affordable Refinance Program (“HARP”).161 Fair housing
enforcement must be vigilant in Ferguson, where many foreclosed-upon
properties are now being held by out-of-state investment firms.162
But it is not enough to simply enforce the laws against discrimination.
Affirmative steps must be taken to promote integration. In particular, black
families in the St. Louis metropolitan area must be empowered to leave segregated areas with concentrated poverty for higher opportunity neighbor157. Rothstein, supra note 17, at 2.
158. See Ferguson Approves Reforms, Crowd Wants Answers, NBC NEWS (Sept.

9, 2014, 9:24 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/
ferguson-approves-reforms-crowd-demands-answers-n199681.
159. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 9, at 46–49; Smith, supra note 147.
160. Moving Ferguson Forward: Mayor and City Council Goals and Progress,
CITY OF FERGUSON, http://www.fergusoncity.com/531/Moving-Ferguson-Forward
(last visited Sept. 7, 2015).
161. See Home Affordable Refinance Program in Ferguson, MO, FERGUSON
HARP PROGRAM, http://ferguson-mo.harploanprogram.net/ (last visited Sept. 7,
2015).
162. See Matthew Goldstein, Another Shadow in Ferguson as Outside Firms Buy
and Rent Out Distressed Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014, 8:25 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/another-shadow-in-ferguson-as-outsidefirms-buy-and-rent-out-distressed-homes/?_r=0.
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hoods. A recent analysis prepared for St. Louis County found that black and
white County residents experience significant disparities in access to opportunity, based on their living patterns and neighborhood conditions.163 Access
to neighborhood opportunity was measured, in part, by how exposed residents were to poverty, the proficiency of their schools, labor market engagement in the neighborhood, and access to jobs.164 On all of these measures,
blacks were significantly worse off than whites.165
One way to promote integration and increase access to opportunity is
through the administration of programs for low-income and affordable housing. The IRS should alter its formula for Low-Income Housing Tax Credits
(“LIHTC”), to incentivize the development of affordable housing in high
opportunity areas.166 This would help provide lower and moderate income
black residents with access to better schools and municipal services. Currently, program requirements that LIHTC properties be built in areas with high
poverty mean that low income housing continues to be concentrated in minority areas.167 Among all LIHTC properties in the St. Louis metropolitan area,
62% of properties are in census tracts that are majority black.168 In St. Louis
County alone, over the past five years, seven out of ten developments that
have received the most preferred type of tax credit have been in North County, which is heavily minority.169 In that same vein, Missouri should add
source of income protections to its human rights statute, which would require
landlords to accept Housing Choice (commonly referred to as “Section 8”)
Vouchers. This would allow voucher-holders greater flexibility in choosing
where to live and enable some to move out of areas of concentrated segregation and poverty – which are currently where the majority of properties willing to accept the vouchers are located.
In addition, HUD and local Housing Authorities can make improvements to its rental assistance programs so that these programs themselves do
not exacerbate racial and economic segregation. The Center on Budget and
163. WFN CONSULTING, ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR HOUSING CHOICE:
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, CITIES OF FLORISSANT AND O’FALLON, MISSOURI 132
(Dec.
2014),
http://wfnconsulting.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/St-Louis-Co-AIFINAL.pdf.
164. Id. at 6.
165. Id. at 131–33.
166. See Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1747, 1753–54, (2005).
167. Editorial, Affordable Housing, Racial Isolation, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/opinion/affordable-housing-racialisolation.html.
168. See Letter from Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. Opportunity Council to Mo.
Hous. Dev. Comm’n, at 1 (June 9, 2015) http://www.prrac.org/pdf/Comments_on_
MHDC_2016_Draft_QAP_Letter_06-09-15.pdf (addressing 2016 Qualified Allocation Plan).
169. Id.
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Policy Priorities recommends a number of policy changes that will encourage
low-income families who use Housing Choice Vouchers to move to lowerpoverty communities, which will in many, if not most, cases decrease racial
segregation.170 For example, HUD could reward agencies that help families
move to so-called “high opportunity areas” with additional funding and extend the search period allowed for families who seek to make such moves.171
At the same time, HUD could revise its metro-wide fair market rent system
and modify its administrative geography to reduce the extent to which existing service area boundaries interfere with agencies’ ability to help families
move into high opportunity areas.172
Indeed, HUD can, should, and likely will play a more active role in policing municipalities, to ensure that they use federal housing funds in a manner that actively promotes integration and housing choice. HUD is responsible for the distribution and oversight of several key sources of federal housing funds, the most significant of which is the Community Development
Block Grant (“CDBG”).173 The funds, which totaled $3 billion for fiscal year
2014, are distributed to roughly 1200 jurisdictions across the country.174 The
federal Fair Housing Act directs HUD to administer its programs and activities “in a manner affirmatively to further the [FHA’s] policies.”175 Although
the term “affirmatively further fair housing” is not defined, the legislative
history of the FHA makes clear that Congress intended for the statute both to
eradicate housing discrimination and to foster integrated living patterns.176
After decades of rather moribund enforcement of this requirement,177 HUD
has recently revitalized its efforts to ensure that grant recipients take their

170. Barbara Sard & Douglas Rice, Creating Opportunity for Children: How
Housing Location Can Make a Difference, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
(Oct.
15,
2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/creating-opportunity-forchildren#_3_0_1.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Community Development Block Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. &
URBAN DEV. (last visited Oct. 4, 2015), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/
program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopment/programs.
174. Id.
175. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012). The statute that created
the CDBG also requires grant recipients to certify to HUD that their grant will be
administered in conformity with the FHA and that the recipient will use the funds in
such a manner to “affirmatively further fair housing.” See id. § 5304(b)(2).
176. See Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated
Housing: A Back-To-The-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively
Further” Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 127–28 (2011–2012) (noting that Congress
passed the FHA shortly after the National Commission on Civil Disorders published
its famous report describing the United States as increasingly segregated, and calling
for “open housing” legislation to remedy this problem).
177. Id. at 153–54 (noting that for many years few grants were denied or rescinded, and no noncompliant grantees were threatened with remedial action).
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obligations under the Fair Housing Act seriously.178 In a particularly encouraging move, HUD has recently issued a new rule, which strengthens this
mandate and offers concrete tools for HUD to assist communities that receive
federal housing funds.179 In particular, HUD will provide publicly open data
and mapping tools to communities so that they can set fair housing goals,
provide incentives for regional collaboration and expand access to high opportunity neighborhoods, and facilitate community participation in the planning process.180
None of these will produce instant results. While the demographics on a
map may shift, patterns of segregation are stubborn. Attitudes about race and
place may be even more so. The quote at the beginning of this Article refers
to the past as prologue, but perhaps the words of William Faulkner summarize it better: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”181

178. Housing Fairness Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 476 Before the Subcomm. on
Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 110 (2010)
(statement of John D. Trasvina HUD Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity) (“HUD has not always fulfilled its obligation to ensure that our money is spent
in ways that affirmatively further fair housing. In this new day, however, there is a
Department-wide commitment to incorporate our mandate to affirmatively further fair
housing into all of our work so that we can fulfill our shared goal of truly integrated
and balanced living patterns.”).
179. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015).
The Rule went into effect on August 17, 2015. Id.
180. HUD Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. &
URBAN
DEV.,
http://www.huduser.org/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/AFFH_Final
_Rule_Executive_Summary.pdf.
181. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN, act 1, sc. 3 (1951).
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